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NOTES & COMMENTS
WHO'S AFRAID OF ERISA WOLF?: § 405(d) AND
OTHER HOUSES OF STRAW FOR TRUSTEES
UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 has swept
away the rather sparse and chaotic structure of state laws in the area
of deferred employee benefits and has created a new federal law of
pensions. 2 In the past, the operation of pension plans has been marred
The labor provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act appear
at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1975). The relevant tax provisions appear at INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-12, 501-03, 4971, 4975 (as amended 1975). The Act
[hereinafter cited as ERISA] is also referred to as the Pension Reform Act of 1974.
2 Hitherto, the only laws governing the administration and operation of employee
pension plans have been the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, 29
U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1970), and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-04, 501-03. As the House
Committee on Education and Labor pointed out in H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1973), the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act has been largely unsuccessful in effecting the administration of pensions and has been substantially replaced
by ERISA. The tax provisions of ERISA complement and, in some instances, amend
existing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. These provisions enlarge the
Code's effect on pension plans, particularly through the implementation of excise taxes
on prohibited transactions in § 2003 of the Act, which amends INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 4975, and through the opening of the Tax Court to any and all parties for the purpose
of seeking declaratory judgements on the qualified status of any plan. For a brief
overview of the tax changes brought about by ERISA, see Lerner & Danker, Highlights
of the 1974 Pension Reform Legislation, 5 TAX ADvisOR 646 (1974).
Section 1 of ERISA indicates that the Congress intended substantially to regulate
all employee benefit plans. Consequently, § 4 brings under the Act:
. . . any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce; or
(2) by an employee organization or organizations representing
employees engaged in commerce; or
(3) by both.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1003 (Supp. 1975). Because virtually all activities "affect commerce"
under the view promulgated by the Supreme Court in cases such as United States v.
Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), the application of ERISA is essentially universal. Other than plans
excluded from application in specific sections, the only plans exempted from the Act
as a whole by § 4 are government plans, church plans, plans maintained outside the
United States providing benefits for non-resident aliens, excess benefit plans (separable plans providing contributions and/or benefits beyond Internal Revenue Code limi-
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by widespread abuse of plan funds, conflicting interests in investment of plan assets, and by a wide range of employer devices for
denying earned benefits to plan participants. Indeed, the scores of
case histories studied by Congress in the early 1970's revealed an
overwhelming tendency to operate pension plans in an overtly unconscionable manner.3 ERISA is designed to put an end to these
abuses and make the promise of a pension concrete rather than illusory.
The Act states that all employee benefit plans are trusts4 to be
operated solely for the benefit -of the employee beneficiaries. 5 Virtations), and otherwise mandatory unemployment, disability, and workmen's compensation plans.
Title I of ERISA, which covers fiduciary responsibility among other areas within
the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, "supersedes" state law. ERISA § 514, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1144 (Supp. 1975). State law is defined as "all laws, decisions, rules, and
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1144(c)(1) (Supp. 1975). Obviously this is a radical and complete wash of all previous
state laws. That the Act "supersedes" rather than merely "prevailing" indicates an
intent to substitute ERISA for all laws previously in existence. See note 64 infra for
further discussion regarding the likely effect of § 514.
The Secretary of Labor has been given authority by the Act to "prescribe such
regulations as he finds necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title I
of the Act]." ERISA § 505, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1135 (Supp. 1975). The regulations will add
much needed explanation to many parts of ERISA. It is doubtful, however, that the
regulations will contribute greatly to the question of avoiding trustee liability. Too
close an attempt at clarification would limit and thus weaken the overall effect of the
fiduciary responsibility sections. It is also doubtful that any regulations concerning
fiduciary responsibility will be provided before the spring of 1976.
3. Hearings on Examination of Welfare and Pension PlansPursuant to S. Res.
35, § 4 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
1971.
4. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a) (Supp. 1975). In addition to the general
exceptions mentioned in note 2 supra,Part 4 of Title I, to which § 403 applies, exempts
plans for payments to retired or deceased partners or the successors in interest of
deceased partners under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736, ERISA § 401(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101(a)(2) (Supp. 1975), and plans which are "unfunded and [are] maintained by
an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select
group of management or highly compensated employees . . . ." ERISA § 401(a)(1),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(1) (Supp. 1975). It is less clear what this last exemption entails,
but it is likely that it was designed primarily to exclude phantom stock benefits and
other top echelon executive compensation schemes and will have limited effect as a
loophole for avoiding the provisions of Part 4. Otherwise, the only plans which are not
considered trusts are plans which are essentially insurance policies, funds kept in
qualified custodial accounts under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 401(c)(1), 403(b)(7), as
amended by ERISA §§ 1022(d)-(3), and certain other plans which may be exempted
by the Secretary of Labor. ERISA § 403(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(b) (Supp. 1975).
ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
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tually all individuals having a part in the operation or administration
of these plans are fiduciaries with respect to the plans6 and are liable
to the plan beneficiaries for losses sustained through the neglect of
any of several fiduciary duties enumerated in the Act.' This liability
focuses most directly on the "named fiduciaries" 8 of the plan, who
have responsibility for the operation and administration of the plan,
and on the trustees who hold the primary authority for management
and control of the plan assets.' The most burdensome impact of
ERISA falls upon the trustee, who must develop the corpus of the
plan trust under stringent standards regarding skill of performance
and for diversification of investments" while avoiding a number of
transactions prohibited by the Act." At the same time, the trustee is
often merely an officer of the employer corporation and may be illequipped to live up to these fiduciary standards.
There are four methods by which a trustee can free himself of
some, though not all, of his potential liability under the Act. 2 The
'The definition of "fiduciary" includes any individual who
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan or . . .its assets, ....renders invest-

ment advice for a fee or other compensation ... with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or ... has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [a] plan.
ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21) (Supp. 1975). The definition is broadly inclusive, particularly the category of individuals who exercise discretion in the administration of plans, and doubtlessly includes many management personnel who would hardly
expect to be called fiduciaries.
7 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (Supp. 1975). The duties of fiduciaries are
discussed in text accompanying notes 23-27 infra.
S See text accompanying note 66 infra.
ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a) (Supp. 1975).
" See note 7 supra.
" See note 26 infra.
12These four methods are discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-43 infra.
One method for helping the trustee manage the assets of the plan, but which does not
relieve him of liability, is to employ an advisor under § 402(c)(2) of the Act. 29
U.S.C.A. § 1102(c)(2) (Supp. 1975). The potential benefit of this method is that advice
may come much cheaper than management. Although it has been postulated that an
advisor may be fiduciarily liable to a plan, Walker, Insured Plans Under the Pension
Reform Act, EXEC. COMP. J., Dec. 1974 at 12, it is more likely that, with the trustee
retaining full responsibility, an investment advisor will not be liable for advice given
in good faith. Thus an individual in the business of rendering investment advice will
be much more willing to provide mere advice at a reasonable fee than to accept actual
power over the handling of the assets. This is particularly true in light of the investmenf manager's potential exposure to liability under the prohibited transaction rules
discussed in note 26 infra.
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most complete diversion of responsibility occurs when an investment
manager is retained to handle investment of plan funds under §
405(d) of the Act. 3 It is to be excepted that this will be the most
widely used method." At the same time the hiring of an investment
manager can be dangerous for the trustee and named fiduciary if
certain precautions are not taken. Therefore, this method of avoiding
liability deserves the closest attention. However, to understand any
single part of ERISA, it is necessary to understand the frame-work
of the Act as a whole.
ERISA concentrates on four major areas of pension plan administration and operation: participation and vesting, funding, disclosure,
and fiduciary responsibility." The participation sections require early
and non-discriminatory participation." They are complemented by
the vesting standards 7 which dictate that a participant's contribu13

ERISA § 405(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(d) (Supp. 1975) states:
(1) If an investment manager or managers have been appointed
under section 1102(c)(3) of this title, then, notwithstanding subsections (a)(2) and (3) and subsection (b) of this section, no trustee shall
be liable for the acts or omissions of such investment manager or
managers, or be under an obligation to invest or otherwise manage any
asset of the plan which is subject to the management of such investment manager.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall relieve any trustee of any
liability under this part for any act of such trustee.

Id.

1 Banks and other institutions which are primarily engaged in the business of
handling trusts will doubtlessly be willing to take on the ERISA responsibilities in
continuing to function as trustees. For those who are appointed trustees through some
other connection with the employer or the plan, however, § 405(d) offers the simplest
and most effective separation between day to day investment responsibility and trusteeship. Thus it is the most advantageous method for those who wish to remove themselves from the fiduciary responsibilities of the Act.
15The participation provisions are found at ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1052
(Supp. 1975) and ERISA §§ 1011, 1015, 1016(a)(2), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 401(a)(3) and adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 410(b)(1), 410(b)(2)(C), 414(b)-(c).
The vesting provisions are found at ERISA §§ 203-07, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1053-57 (Supp.
1975) and ERISA § 1012, addingINT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 411. The funding provisions
are found at ERISA §§ 301-05, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1081-85 (Supp. 1975) and ERISA § 1013,
amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404 and adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 412,
4971. The disclosure provisions are found at ERISA §§ 101-10, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-30
(Supp. 1975). The fiduciary responsibility provisions are found at ERISA §§ 401-13,
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-13 (Supp. 1975) and ERISA § 2003, adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 4975.
11In almost all cases, participation must be available after the employee reaches
the age of 25 or has been employed for 3 years. In some cases, participation must be
available to the employee after one year of employment. ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C.A. §
1052 (Supp. 1975).
11See note 15 supra.
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tions to a plan be one hundred per cent recoverable and that his
interest in employer contributions become vested according to one of
three alternate plans, all of which provide for comparatively rapid
vesting.'" The funding requirements'9 provide new assurance.of adequate funding by requiring amortization of past costs in calculating
present employer contributions to the fund. 21 Prior to ERISA, these
costs were usually written off as losses to the plan, resulting in reduced benefits available to retiring employees. The disclosure provisions of the Act' do what its predecessor, the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act of 1958,22 failed to do-they require extensive
and complete reporting of plan information both to the Secretary of
Labor and to the plan participants. The information which is diseminated to the participants must be in non-technical language so as to
be understandable by employees unfamiliar with the-language and
complexities of pension and other deferred benefit plans. These first
three broad requirements provide a structure which, if followed, will
guarantee adequate development and administration of pension
funds. If those persons handling pension plans act in good faith and
,S The first of the three plans, ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a)(2)(a)
(Supp. 1975), provides for 100% vesting after 10 years with no vesting prior to that
time. The second plan provides for graduated vesting over a ten year period starting
with the fifth year of employment, ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a)(2)(B)
(Supp. 1975). Thus, after the fifth year, the participant receives a 25% vested interest.
The percentage of vested interest increases five per cent per year for five years thereafter and ten per cent per year for the next five years so that the participant's interest
is 100% vested at the end of fifteen years of employment.
The third rule is the "rule of 45." Under this rule after the participant has been
employed for five years and the sum of the participant's age and years of service equals
45, the participant receives a 50% vested interest. Thereafter, as the sum of the employee's age and years of service increases, his vested interest increases in 10% increments. After 10 years of service, if the sum of age plus years of service equals 55, the
participant's interest will be 100% vested. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1053(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1975).
11See note 15 supra.
2* The past costs consist of "past service liabilities" and "experience losses."
ERISA § 302(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082-(c)(1) (Supp. 1975). Past service liabilities are
liabilities for a participant's employment prior to the inception of a pension plan.
Experience losses are investment losses. Under ERISA, if these losses were incurred
imprudently, the responsible fiduciary will be liable to the plan for the amount of the
loss. Whether or not the loss was incurred imprudently, however, the employer must
make sure that the loss is made up. The employer does this by amortizing the loss over
not less than a fifteen year period in calculating annual contributions to the plan.
Experience gains can also be calculated into the annual contribution figure on an
amortized basis. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082 (Supp. 1975).
21 See note 15 supra.
2 See note 2 supra.
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in accordance with these requirements of the Act, plan participants
should receive full benefits upon retirement.
To insure that those administering plans will act appropriately,
ERISA contains new and stringent standards of fiduciary responsibility. On the general level, nearly everyone in any way capable of
affecting the administration of an ERISA plan or of plan assets is
deemed a fiduciary. More specifically, each plan must have one or
more named fiduciariess who have authority to manage the operation
and administration of the plan,24 and one or more trustees to administer the assets of the plan.? All fiduciaries, including trustees, are
charged with four general duties and several specific duties in relation
to the plan. The general duties, delineated in § 404,26 require that
ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a)(1) (Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent
part: "[Every plan] instrument shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who
jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan." Id.
24 The "named fiduciary" apparently provides focus for the enforcement of fiduciary standards. HousE CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 2d Sess., 1974 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5077, states that one purpose of having a named fiduciary is to provide plan
participants with an indentified individual for questions and grievances. Thus administration of the plan and enforcement of the Act will probably revolve around this
person or group of people.
21ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a) (Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
[All assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one
or more trustees. Such trustee or trustees shall be either named in the
trust instrument or in the plan instrument described in section
1102(a) of this title or appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary,
and upon acceptance of being named or appointed, the trustee or
trustees shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and
control the assets of the plan ....
Id. Excluded from this section are plans which are essentially insurance policies and
certain plans in custodial accounts under § 408 of the Internal Revenue Code. ERISA
§ 403(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(b) (Supp. 1975).
2
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (Supp. 1975). The specific duties are drawn in the negative
and prohibit the involvement of any fiduciary in certain types of transactions. ERISA
§ 406, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106 (Supp. 1975). If a fiduciary plays any part in bringing about
a prohibited transaction, and if that transaction results in a loss to the plan, the
fidiciary is liable for the amount of that loss. Id.
The fiduciary must not take part in or allow a sale or exchange or leasing of
property, or a lending of money or extension of credit, or a furnishing of goods or
services or facilities, or a transfer of assets between the plan and a party in interest.
Id.
A fiduciary may not allow a plan to hold more than 10% of the assets or securities
of the employer corporation. ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107 (Supp. 1975). Neither
may the fiduciary deal with the assets for his own account or in the interest of an
adverse party. Id.
In addition to liability for resulting losses, violation of the prohibited transaction
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fiduciaries: (1) in dealing with the plan, conduct themselves soldly for
the purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; (2) act with the care and skill of "a prudent man familiar with
such matters"-this has been called the prudent expert standard; (3)
diversify investments of the plan so as to avoid the risk of large losses;
and (4) act in accordance with all plan documents which are consistent with the Act." Liability for breach of one of these general fiduciary duties will equal the loss the plan sustains thereby.2
The prudent expert standard and the requirement of diversification are the two most troublesome of these general duties. They are
uncomfortably ambiguous, 9 and both will require a level of skill and
diligence to which most trustees and fiduciaries other than banks and
investment houses will be unaccustomed and which even banks and
investment houses will find burdensome. The duties will fall most
heavily on trustees, with whom the responsibility for investment of
plan assets lies. Because-plan trustees in closely held corporations
and other small businesses are likely to be officers of the corporation
or partners, rather than large bank and trust companies, it would
seem desirable to shift as much of the burden of potential liability
as possible from those trustees. Even where the trustee is a third
rules can trigger the assessment of rather severe excise taxes under the tax provisions
of ERISA. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4975 as amended by ERISA § 2003(a).
2 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. 1975). The second duty,
the "prudent expert" standard, states that the fiduciary will conduct himself "with
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that
a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims .

. . ."

ERISA §

404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1975).
2 ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (Supp. 1975) outlines the liability for
breach of fiduciary duty. The liability amounts to: (1) reimbursement for losses sustained by the plan, (2) restitution of any profit derived by the fiduciary for misdealings
with plan assets, and (3) any "other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary." Id. It is noteworthy that losses may
not have to be sustained by the participants in order to be recoverable. State courts
have been willing since Trustees of Hanover College v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jennette,
Inc., (Civ. No. 71-C 686, S.D.Ind., Dec. 14, 1972) and as recently as In Re Bank of New
York, 35 N.Y. 2d 512, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 164 (1974), to focus on individual transactions
despite overall plan growth in deciding upon the liability of trustees for imprudent
investments.
" Precious little help is given in deciphering the "prudent expert" requirement.
HousE CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 2d Sess., 1974 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5083, uses
the term "prudent investor." Although the regulations may offer some clarification,
the definition will probably have to be ironed out in the courts. There are no guidelines
for proper diversification. With the myriad of investment possibilities available, the
fiduciary will simply have to follow his instincts, prudent and expert instincts, in
deciding how diversified the investments must be.
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party, such as a local bank, the complexity of the fiduciary duties and
the high cost of failure" dictate transfer of responsibility to an individual whose sole concern and expertise are directed toward portfolio
management.
It is doubtful that a trustee can rid himself of responsibility entirely.3' Nonetheless, four methods of transferring partial responsibility are available under the Act.2 The first two methods involve the
use of more than one trustee. The third results from the inclusion in
the plan of a clause making the actions of the trustee subject to the
direction of a named fiduciary. The fourth requires the hiring of an
outside investment manager to administer the assets of the plan.
If there is more than one trustee under a plan, trustee responsibilities can be divided between the trustees in either of two ways. To
reduce the overall size of the trustee's responsibility, § 405(b)(3)(A)
of the Act provides that the plan instrument can separate the assets
of the plan into more than one trust. In this manner, the individual
trustee need only be concerned with the assets in his assigned trust.
He faces no liability, as a trustee, for losses to trusts administered by
other trustees.34 Thus, overall liability is reduced to the amount of the
assets in the trustee's assigned trust. The complexity of the job is
reduced to the extent that the amount of money the trustee is responsible for has been substantially reduced.
Despite the appeal of separate trusts, however, it is necessary to
note that complications may arise. Although fiduciaries are generally
prohibited from investing fund assets in employer securities or employer assets,3" they may do so to the extent that such investments
do not exceed 10% of fund assets. If separate trusts are not coordi3 ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1109 (Supp. 1975). This is particularly true in
connection with the specific fiduciary duties laid down by the Act. These duties are
discussed in note 26 supra.
3' The closest a trustee can come to completely divesting himself of liability is
through the use of an investment manager. See text accompanying notes 39-72 infra.
11It is possible for a plan to eliminate the need for a trustee by shifting all of the
assets to an insurance policy or a qualifying. custodial account. See note 24 supra.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1975).
Liability as a fiduciary is retained, however. This means that, under § 405(a)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(a) (Supp. 1975), if a trustee of trust 'A' knows or should
know that a trustee of trust 'B' is in breach of his fiduciary duty, he must report or
make attempts to secure remedy of that breach. Whether or not he should know of that
co-fiduciary's breach will probably depend upon whether a "prudent man familiar with
such matters," see note 29 supra., would know of such a breach. If the trustee of trust
'A' would have no reason to be familiar with the other's activities he would not be liable
as a co-fiduciary.

See note 26 supra.
Under § 407(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a) (Supp. 1975), 10% of certain
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nated, each trustee might invest 10% of total plan assets in employer
securities resulting in an overall figure well beyond the 10% limitation. Therefore, caution must be taken in making such investments.37
Furthermore, this method of distributing liability results merely in a
reduction of the overall amount and does not safeguard the trustee
in areas in which he is either unqualified or unwilling to assume
responsibility.3 Neither does it relieve the trustee of fiduciary liabil39
ity incurred for failing to report the misconduct of another trustee.
As an alternative to creating several trusts, the trust instrument
can authorize allocation of specific responsibilities, obligations, or
duties among several trustees." In this fashion, trustees can be
shielded from direct liability for those tasks allocated to another trustee." Thus, a trustee could retain authority for management within
the area of his investment expertise without having to deal with other
matters. A trustee who is a director of the employer corporation could
manage 10% of the assets, investing them in employer securities,"
and allow a bank to manage the rest. A trustee who was originally
brought in to develop plan investments in local real estate could
continue to do so without shouldering responsibility for the entire
plan.
Several problems confront this method of diverting trustee liability. Section 405(a) imposes liability on a trustee who knows or has
the opportunity to know of the wrongful act of another trustee.4 3 Since
employer assets and securities may be held by the plan. Two trustees, each handling
a trust equal to 50% of plan assets, might invest 20% of their respective trusts in
employer securities, thinking that they were within the overall plan limitation. Adding
the amounts held by the two trusts, however, would result in a percentage figure twice
as high as allowable under § 407(a).
n If, however, the trusts were assigned with different investment instructions it
might be possible to fit the trust to the trustee. For instance, a corporate officer with
little investment expertise could be given a trust containing 5% of the trust assets and
be told to invest them in employer securities. The rest of the assets could be given to
a corporate director who had investment experience and would be instructed to invest
in no employer securities. Nonetheless, breaking up the fund into smaller trusts is
economically disadvantageous. The trustee would have fewer funds to draw on in
attempting to capitalize on investment opportunities while maintaining diversification
and adequate liquidity.
1 See note 34 supra.
§ 405(b)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
,0This is not to say that all possible liability is lost. The trustee is still responsible,
as a fiduciary, for certain cofiduciary breaches. See note 34 supra. He is not directly
responsible for a co-fiduciary breach, however, unless he knows or should know of such
breach.
,1See note 26 supra.
42 29 U.S.C.A. § 1105(a).
'1 See note 33 supra.
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the operations of the several trustees may well be so intertwined that
their effective separation is impossible, knowledge or the opportunity
for knowledge of misconduct, either of which will trigger liability
under that section, is almost inevitable.44 Furthermore, the trustees
still must diversify the trust assets and will probably be liable if by
their separate activities they create a dangerous concentration of investments.4" Lastly, a trust instrument clearly and safely dividing
responsibilities will be extremely difficult to draft.
Rather than attempting to divide responsibility among the trustees, the plan may provide that one of the named fiduciaries shall
direct the activities of the trustee. In other words, although the
assets will be in the hands of the trustee, he will invest those assets
at the will and discretion of the named fiduciary. If the directions of
the named fiduciary are proper and in accordance with the plan, the
trustee ceases to be primarily responsible for their consequences.4"
However, the Act does not allow for total reliance on the instructions of the named fiduciary. The trustee acts properly only in follow" Trustees must cooporate in handling the fund so as to live up to the diversification requirements and to maintain liquidity while providing for growth. As the Joint
Conference Committee Report indicates, undue accumulations of investments in any
single industry or geographical area may make the trustees liable for losses resulting
therefrom. Trustees must therefore coordinate so that they do not all invest in one
particularly attractive area, because their combined efforts might cause concentration
of large amounts of total plan assets in that area. If five trustees of a fund each control
20% of fund assets, any one trustee could place a fifth of his assets in petroleum
industry securities and he would only be committing 4% of total fund assets to that
industry. If all the trustees followed suit, however, 20% of total plan assets would be
dependent upon the success of the petroleum industry. The danger of this kind of
concentration should be obvious and would doubtless be recognized by the courts.
At the same time, trustees must provide for plan growth while maintaining sufficient liquidity to handle payments to plan beneficiaries. Economic sense would dictate
that decisions concerning which assets to lock in for growth and which assets to keep
liquid should be made on the basis of the plan as a whole. Arguably, therefore, compliance with the prudent expert standard would involve coordination of asset management and investment.
11This would occur when trustee 'A' assumes that trustee 'B' is not investing in a
particular area. As a result, both trustees invest in that area creating a dangerous
concentration of assets.
" ERISA § 403(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a)(1)
(Supp. 1975), states that the
trustee is responsible for the investment of fund assets except to the extent that:
the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject to
the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee, in which case
the trustees shall be subject to proper directions of such fiduciary
which are made in accordance with the terms of the plan and which
are not contrary to this subchapter. Id.
'7 See note 26 supra.

1975]

RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

ing instructions which are themselves proper and which conform to
the trust instrument. The trustee is, after all, primarily responsible
for the assets of the plan and if he follows an improper order and the
plan suffers, § 403(a)(1) will not shield him. Obviously this puts a
burden on the trustee to monitor the activities of the plan. Just how
detailed this scrutiny must be is unclear, but certainly some study
must be given to the wisdom of the orders received from the named
fiduciary." Section 403(a)(1), like the creation of multiple trusts
under § 405(b) (3) (A) or the division of responsibilities among trustees
under § 405(b) (1) leaves the trustees with an undesirable amount of
responsibility under the Act.
The final method of diverting trustee responsibility is to appoint
an investment manager. Under § 402(c)(3)49 the plan instrument may
provide that one of the named fiduciaries shall hire an investment
manager to administer plan investments." If the plan provides for
such a procedure, the trustee's "exclusive authority and discretion to
manage and control the assets of the plan" is subject to the authority
of the investment manager.5 Furthermore, under § 405(d) "no trustee
shall be liable for the acts or omissions of [his plan's] investment
manager or managers, or be under an obligation to invest or otherwise
manage any asset of the plan which is subject to the management of
such investment manager."52 This appears to be a successful method
of safeguarding the trustee. However, the mere appearance of protec" It is conceivable that the burden of supervision is not as heavy as it appears.
At least one commentator feels that an instruction must be improper "on its face"
before the trustee is under a duty to disobey the instruction. Weiss Voboril, Fiduciary
Standardsand Investment Responsibility Under the New PensionReform Law, 112 J.
TRUSTS & ESTATES 800, 802 (December 1974). However, the trustee should conduct
himself as an "expert," and courts will likely demand a certain degree of inspection
prior to compliance with instructions.
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
0The named fiduciary to whom the responsibility for hiring the investment manager is delegated shall be a "named fiduciary with respect to control or management

of the assets of the plan .

. . ."

29 U.S.C.A. § 1102(c)(3) (Supp. 1975). This sounds

quite like the trustee, and Congress may have intended that the trustee and the
"named fiduciary with respect to control or management of the assets of the plan" be
the same individual. Certainly it is possible for them to be one in the same. Indeed,
for an employer utilizing an investment manager under § 402(c)(3) of the Act, administration would be simplified by combining the two positions. However, they may be
different individuals if the plan so specifies. In this event, although the named fiduciary will have responsibility overlapping that of the trustee, the trustee must keep in
mind that his title carries with it certain responsibilities in connection with the plan
funds. See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
51ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a) (Supp. 1975).
5229 U.S.C.A. § 1105(d)(1) (Supp. 1975).
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tion is an inadequate shield, in light of the overall approach of
53
ERISA.
The primary reason for doubting the effectiveness of delegating
responsibility under § 405(d) is that delegation runs counter to established trust principles." Although investment managers may have
been used in the administration of trust funds, traditionally the trustee has never been allowed to divest himself of primary responsibility
for the trust.55 Specifically, trustees have been forbidden to allow
anyone else to invest fund assets." Indeed, the whole purpose of naming a particular trustee would appear to be subverted by allowing the
trustee to relinquish his role as keeper of the trust.
The argument to the contrary is that ERISA "supersedes" the
prior law of trusts according to § 514 of the Act.57 "Supersedes" presumably means that the Act makes all previous laws void and replaces them with an entirely new structure. Certainly, § 514 is broad
in scope but it could not have been meant to do away with the prior
common law of trusts. 8 On the contrary, the inclusion of § 403,11
1 One commentator has described ERISA as having "elements that suggest a
quality not unlike biblical atonement or revenge. Succeeding generations must now
atone for the sins of a small percentage of fiduciaries." Weiss & Voboril, Fiduciary
Standardsand Investment Responsibility Under the New Pension Reform Law, 112 J.
TRUSTS & ESTATES 800, 802 (December 1974). Another has described the fiduciary
responsibility provisions as "burdensome and frightening, and all indications are that
they were meant to be so." Walker, Insured Plans Under the Pension Reform Act,
ExEc. COMP. J., Dec. 1974 at 12. The Act was clearly intended to reach as far as
possible im forcing adherence to high standards of conduct on the part of anyone whose
actions might effect a covered plan.
11 DeKorwin v. First Nat. Bank, 179 F.2d 347 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 339 U.S, 982
(1959); Hanson v. Birmingham, 92 F.Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa), appeal denied, 190 F.2d
206 (8th Cir. 1950).
" A. SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 171 (1960).
See, e.g., Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Colby, 108 F.2d 743, 747 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
51ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (Supp. 1975) states, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan ....
(c)(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State.
Id.
Although federal courts have often had to deal with trust issues, trust law has
been primarily developed at the state court level. If § 514 truly displaces all state laws
regarding trusts, and courts interpreting ERISA are thereby prevented from looking
to state law, then the word "trust" as used in the Act would carry no substantial
meaning. It is more likely, therefore, that § 514 was primarily intended to nullify only
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requiring that all pensions be held in trust, was meant to include
within the Act all the protections built into the law of trusts. This
message comes through most clearly from a reading of the legislative
history of ERISA.0 Rather than making the word "trust" a term of
art, ERISA relies on the extant consequences of the word to create a
foundation of fiduciary responsibility.
The House Ways and Means committee summary of the Act,
published in September of 1974, stated:
The act establishes federal fiduciary standards to protect
against defalcation or other misuse of pension funds. The labor
law provisions of title I apply standards and remedies similar
to those of traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fidiciaries.11
The House Committee on Education and Labor, which was more
directly involved in drafting the fiduciary responsibility provisions, "2
was more emphatic. In a report accompanying the House version of
the Act, the committee noted that the fiduciary responsibility section
was essentially a codification of prior trust law. " The committee
report further noted that a primary purpose of the incorporation of
trust law was to avoid deviations from strict trust principles. 4 Thus,
in the eyes of ERISA's creators and despite the apparently contrary
indications of § 514, a plan trust is not meant to be a novel device
those state laws which were at odds with general trust principles.
51It has been emphasised that, because of the time and care taken by the four
congressional committees involved in creating ERISA, the legislative history is particularly important and helpful in arriving at the true meaning of the Act. Remarks of
Mario F. Noto, Esq. participating faculty member, American Law Institute - American
Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education, Course of Study on
New Pension Legislation (Richmond, Va. 1975).
H.R. REP. No. 406, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
" 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103 (Supp. 1975).
62 There were four committees involved in drafting ERISA. The tax provisions
were drawn by the House Ways and Means Committee and by the Senate Finance
Committee. The labor provisions were drawn by the House Committee on Education
and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Final differences
were ironed out in the Joint Conference Committee on the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
64 Id. at 12. Indeed, the House report indicates an attempt to avoid the results
reached in a few errant jurisdictions that had allowed delegation of trustee responsibility if such was the intent of the trust maker. Congress wanted, instead, to bring ERISA
back to the more common rule against delegation. The central reason for this specific
reference to the majority rule is that ERISA plans do not have trust makers per se.
The purpose of a pension trust is not to satisfy the wants of the trust maker but to
provide for the beneficiaries.
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but a reflection of older trust principles.
It is unavoidable, therefore, that the long standing prohibition
against a trustee's delegation of responsibility will carry over to some
degree into judicial interpretations of the Act. Even federal case law,
from which courts may draw authority under the Act,65 recognizes the
restriction. The Supreme Court held in Oliver v. Piatt66 that a trustee
may not allow others to perform his duties. Although the rule has
been relaxed somewhat by the lower courts, 7 it still applies firmly to
the actual investment of fund assets. Therefore, assuming that the
Act incorporates the existing law of trusts, any section which purportedly relieves the trustee of responsibility for the acts or omissions of
the investment manager is highly suspect."
This suspicion applies with even greater force to the liability of
the named fiduciary.69 Because he has the power, under a plan which
so provides, to hire an investment manager and thereby apparently
divest the trustee of responsibility, the named fiduciary holds considerable power over the assets of the plan. Noting this power, the Conference Committee Report states that "in choosing an investment
manager, the named fiduciary must act prudently and in the interests of participants and beneficiaries and also must act in this manner in continuing the use of an investment manager."7 Thus, any
responsibility which is lifted from the trustee apparently shifts to the
named fiduciary who appoints the investment manager. Additionally, while it can be assumed that ERISA does focus the responsibilities of trusteeship on the trustee so named, the named fiduciary is a
primary figure in the trust-the only primary figure when the trustee
is stripped of his active role by § 403(a)(1).' It is probable, therefore,
that the underlying common law prohibition against delegation of
duty on the part of the trustee would apply equally to the named
fiduciary, at least where the trustee drops out of the picture.
While § 405(d) appears to provide a means by which all responsi65ERISA

§ 514(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(d) (Supp. 1975) states that "[n]othing in

this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law of the United States . . . ." Id.
" 44 U.S. (3 How.) 333 (1844).
6, Schofield v. John R. Thompson Co., 109 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1940); Russell v. Rici,
213 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966).
" The alternative is to assume that ERISA loosens rather than tightens the reins
on fiduciaries. However, this would work against the interest of the beneficiaries, and
the Act was intended to do just the opposite.
, See note 50 supra.
70 HousE CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 2d Sess., 1974 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5082,
(emphasis added).
7129 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).
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bility is shifted to a third party, the investment manager, the legislative history and the common law sources of the fiduciary responsibility Part suggest that such a result is prohibited. The § 405(d) delegation procedure will probably be interpreted within a framework of
traditional trust principles, such as the trustee's powers to engage the
services of an agent, that seem analogous to and in harmony with the
Act. A trustee may hire an agent to carry out certain administrative
functions, as long as the trustee properly employs, instructs, and
watches over that agent. 2 The exact boundaries of this rule are unclear, but it would appear to offer the most viable solution to understanding the use of the investment manager under § 405(d). There
are two basic approaches to deciding what can be done by an agent.
One view holds that ministerial functions may be delegated but that
discretionary functions may not. 3 The other view is somewhat
broader and holds that a trustee may delegate any function that a
private owner would delegate.74 Of these two common law views, the
second would seem to be a more workable approach to trustee delegation" and could justify the kind of delegation contemplated under §
405(d).
Assuming that the investment manager can be considered an
agent of the trustee or of the named fiduciary, responsibility for certain investment functions can be lifted from the trustee and delegated to the agent, arguably without violating traditional principles
of trust law. At the same time, however, some responsibility must
remain in the trustee in order to maintain the trust structure. 6 The
problem is to find a model in the common law that is responsive to
trustee delegation under the Act.
Perhaps the best model for constructing the responsibility of the
trustee and the named fiduciary is one provided by the Restatement
of Trusts.7 Like the Conference Committee Report on ERISA, the
G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 92 (5th ed. 1973).
13See, e.g., In re Hartzell, 192 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963); Attorney Gen. v.
Olson, 191 N.E.2d 132 (Mass. 1963). See also, G. BOGERT, supra n. 72.
11See, e.g., Russell v. Rici, 213 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966). See also, G.
12

BOGERT, supra n. 72.

1- This second view is not as flexible as it appears. For instance, it would probably
not allow delegation of such activities as selecting proper investments. See, e.g., Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Colby, 108 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Nonetheless, its
similarity to § 405(d) delegation and the fact that it is the only way to harmonize the
Act with generally established trust principles justify expanding the view to encompass
§ 405(d) delegation.
76 The investment manager, by virtue of his relationship to the plan, has become
a fiduciary. However, the fiduciary status of one who is essentially a third party is
insufficient to support the statement that the plan assets were held in trust.
11RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS 2d, § 225.
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Restatement notes that the decision to hire an agent, e.g., the investment manager, carries with it the responsibility for maintaining that
agent (or manager). The Restatement additionally lists several specific duties which are retained. If they are not fulfilled, the trustee is
liable for any breach by his agent.7 8 Primary among these responsibilities are the duty to correct known errors and the duty to supervise
the activity of the agent. 9 Supervision, then, is arguably the most
important resonsibility retained by the trustee and the named fiduciary.
This raises the question of what constitutes supervision; whether
the named fiduciary should simply request a summary of investment
progress every ten years, or whether he should examine every action
of the investment manager. The "acts and omissions" clause of §
405(d)80 indicates that responsibility for individual transactions lies
with the investment manager. On the other hand, supervision must
be frequent enough to provide a valid opportunity for discovering a
pattern of misconduct by the investment manager before the plan
assets suffer significantly. In deciding how closely to supervise, then,
the focus should be on the investment manager and what kind of
investments he will be managing.
The investment manager can be a bank, an insurance company,
or a registered investment adviser.' The range of potential managers
runs from large banking establishments to small local investment
houses. The degree of risk ranges proportionately. A named fiduciary
might prefer to appoint one or more local investment houses which
have reputations for making a good profit in local markets but are
smaller and less secure than a large bank would be. If so, the named
fiduciary would be wise to monitor the investment manager's conduct
rather closely.
78 Id.

, Section 225 states in pertinent part:
(2) The trustee is liable to the beneficiary for an act of such an
agent which if done by the trustee would constitute a breach of trust,
if the trustee ....

(d) does not exercise proper supervision over the conduct of the
agent; or
(e) approves or acquiesces in or conceals the act of the agent;
or
(f) neglects to take proper steps to compel the agent to redress
the wrong.

Id.

so See note 12 supra.
9, ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(38) (Supp. 1975).
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The scope of the task assigned to the investment manager" will
also affect the need for supervision. For instance, if a manager is hired
solely for the purpose of investing 20% of the plan assets in municipal
bonds,83 the named fiduciary can safely take a less active role in
monitoring the investment of those funds than he could if all assets
were placed in the care of one manager. Specific instructions on how
to make investments would likewise reduce the necessity for in depth
review of the investment manager's activities, although the named
fiduciary would have to take steps to insure that his instructions were
being followed. The degree of scrutiny involved in overseeing the
actions of the investment manager will thus depend upon the construction of the particular plan.
Certainly review should take place more than once annually. A
pattern of misconduct resulting in substantial loss to the fund could
easily occur in less than a year's time. A small sized investment
house, panicked by a series of losses in a depressed economy, might
engage in a number of ill-advised, high-risk investments that could
severely deplete a fund within the space of only a few months. A
named fiduciary placing all of a fund's assets in the hands of such a
small investment house might be liable for not demanding frequent
summaries of investment activities. Indeed, the pension board of one
corporation intends to review plan investments once a month. 4
Whether review occurs monthly, semi-annually or otherwise will
probably have to be decided on an individual basis.
The decision must be made, nonetheless, and must be made with
prudence and skill.8 5 Both the named fiduciary and the trustee should
take part in the supervision. Although the Act removes the cofiduciary liability burden of § 405(a)(2)-(3) from the trustee, 8 a court
would probably attach some form of liability to a trustee who had
completely ignored the handling of assets which had been placed in
11The named fiduciary has the power to decide exactly what functions he will
allow the investment manager to perform. ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1102(c)(3)(Supp. 1975).
83 Obviously, this would involve assigning a relatively small percentage of the plan
assets to the investment manager. Otherwise the named fiduciary would be violating
the diversification requirement of § 404(a)(1)(C) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104
(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1975).
1, Remarks of Mortimer Caplin, Esq. participating faculty member, American
Law Institute - American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education, Course of Study on New Pension Legislation (Richmond, Va. 1975).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1975).
" ERISA §§ 405(a)(2)-(3), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1105(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 1975), require
that a fiduciary exercise reasonable care to make sure that no other fiduciary is committing a breach. If a fiduciary notices a breach, Le must report or remedy it. Id.
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his care. The creation of a pension board, the mechanism which will
be used by most employers, will probably be the best method for
allowing both the trustee and the named fiduciary to monitor the
actions of the investment manager. By receiving periodic and adequately informative reports from the investment manager, the board
will enable both fiduciaries to supervise the handling of the fund
without duplication of effort.
When regulations on the fiduciary provisions of ERISA are finally
promulgated, the question of distributing liability may be clarified
somewhat. However, it is doubtful that any of the four methods discussed will be deemed to shield the trustee or the named fiduciary
entirely. Regulations to that effect would cause a severe break with
established notions of trust law, contrary to the intent of the Congress.
Each method carries a certain degree of retained liability. The
appointment of an investment manager is probably the best way to
divert responsibility and liability because of the provisions of §
405(d). But even § 405(d) is not an absolute safeguard. The named
fiduciary is still responsible for continuing the employment of the
investment manager. The trustee, to the extent that ERISA must rely
on general principles of trust law, would be well advised to stay in
the picture in a supervisory capacity. Finally, it would appear essential that both the trustee and named fiduciary monitor the activity
of the investment manager several times annually to assure themselves that his actions do not reveal a pattern of behavior which is
inconsistent with the plan and instructions or dangerous to the assets.
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